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Purpose: There is mounting fear that the present-day Local 
Government managers do not appropriately respond to pro-poor 
service delivery. Yet, the number of people lacking access to 
quality services is swelling. This fault has placed a growing burden 
on Local Governments to enhance local councilors' political 
accountability by ensuring that the basic services are made 
delivered to citizens with accountability. Given the different 
challenges and observed shortage of political accountability in 
Uganda, this study examined the contribution of political 
accountability towards achieving pro-poor service delivery in a 
Ugandan Municipality.  
Research methodology: Using five Focus group discussions, 
perspectives on accountability are debated as a foundation for 
improving service delivery. 
Limitation: The study covers only Uganda and may not easily be 
generalised to other countries. 
Results: Results indicate that political accountability is key to 
implementing a municipal development plan.  
Contribution: The study contributes to knowledge so that hands-
on accountability holds potential and requires more consideration 
as a means to assimilate learning-based methods and role-players 
network to back up the delivery of pro-poor services. It is proposed 
that local councilors become more responsive to meet the growing 
need for pro-poor service delivery in a Municipal council. 
Keywords: Accountability, Pro-poor service delivery, Horizontal, 
Vertical, Diagonal 
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1. Introduction 
The degree to which accountability can influence Municipal service delivery in the Less-Developing 
Countries (LDCs) is drawing much consideration among academics and legislators worldwide. This 
consideration arises from several concerns. The first concern is that there are indications that trends of 
service delivery are taking a rapid shift given the simplification of organisational processes and 
arrangements (Bolgherini et al., 2019:112), collaborations between public and private sectors (Casady 
et al 2019:2), sporadic urbanisation (BIdandi & Williams, 2017:2), as well as demographic transition 
experiencing significant reforms in local Municipalities (Eastwood & Lipton, 2011:9). The inference 
of these considerations is that it is no longer enough for local Municipalities to provide adequate and 
quality services to meet the dynamic urban population. The second concern is that some 
Municipalities in Uganda have failed to provide services with the profession and skill necessary 
(Mbazira, 2013:252). Consequently, there is a wider deficit in service delivery in almost every sector 
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ranging from physical infrastructure, including roads and bridges, hospitals, and schools to social 
infrastructure (Musenze et al 2014:93).   
Municipalities in Uganda have to endure endless condemnations for the view that their service 
delivery approach has little or no significance to the social and economic needs of their residents 
(Nastar et al 2019:358), which results in the provision of inadequate or low-quality services or both. 
Indications from previous research revealed that the high frequency of service delivery protests 
suffered by Municipalities is a consequence of the inadequacy and shortage of certain urban services 
essential to an urban resident (Mbazira, 2013). Proof supporting this statement demonstrates that out 
of approximately 35 Municipalities in the country, none had a favourable road network, maybe as a 
result of their deficiency of necessary funds for providing such services, until the World Bank offered 
support through the Uganda support for municipal infrastructure (Mwesigwa, 2018). Likewise, a 
study conducted by the UN-Habitat (2015:8) notes that approximately several urban authorities in 
developing nations, including Municipalities in Uganda, are both under-resourced and lack 
sustainable local revenue sources.  
According to Kayiwa et al (2020:2), several urban residents who access the basic urban services are 
not pleased with the quality of service. For those who access quality urban services, the services are 
never adequate regardless of having met all their tax obligations. Similarly, Mwesigwa and Mubangizi 
(2015) reveal apprehensions regarding local councilors' ability and or mayor to respond to some 
residents' petitions concerning the ever-deteriorating quality basic services, for example, roads, street 
lighting, and basic sanitation. The above study also reveals acute shortages in political interaction 
between local councillors and or mayors and the residents; this is made worse by lack of regular 
communication, dearth of accountability, and scarcity in both practical and supervisory abilities. The 
outcomes of this research corroborated with those of comparative analyses, for example, those of 
Nattabi (2020). The scope of deficiency of political obligation as exposed in these researches further 
maintained the view that many Municipalities in Uganda were faced with scarcity of sources of 
revenue and where such sources existed. The government decided to centralise them through the 
central agency (Uganda Revenue Authority).  
The idea of service delivery is challenging to the conventional municipal governance theory and 
attracts questions regarding the significance of creating several Municipalities in Uganda. Normally, it 
is the prospect of municipal residents, including Uganda, in several nations to enjoy decent services 
better than their rural counterparts. As stated by McConville et al. (2019:586), this prospect is 
coherent from the view of urban life, which demands that municipal residents be offered descent 
services such as roads, street lighting, healthcare, education, sanitation, and security. Nonetheless, 
with the present-day challenge where a dearth of accountability translates into low quality or 
inadequate service, this view remains a deception for some municipal residents and visitors. 
Considering accountability in Uganda, as deliberated, this article offers a perspective of enhancing 
accountability from the view of pro-poor service delivery. While strategies (such as citizen 
participation, accountability and transparency) have been put forth by academics, such as Musenze 
and Mayende (2020:2) as well as various civil society organisations that underscore governance to 
advance views on municipal service delivery, none appear applicable to the Ugandan circumstances 
where conditions of governance are different. 
In Uganda, available studies (such as Birungi and Colbourn, 2019:372) on accountability are few. 
Such studies mainly list different general abilities and attributes (such as position, influence, and 
interest) electorates demand from the leadership at various levels. However, they fail to discuss key 
components of accountability and how accountability is related, contributes to, and impacts pro-poor 
service delivery in a local Municipality. 
The central focus of this article is the prevalent condition of shortage of accountability among some 
municipal service providers in Uganda, which is one of the key causal factors to poor service delivery 
in much of the country and beyond. For example, in China, accountability is very key in every aspect 
of governance, including rural poverty reduction strategies (Zhou & Cai, 2020:287; Wu & 
Christensen, 2020:5). Also, studies reveal a shift from monetary accountability to accountability due 
to its significance to the European Union (Steinbach, 2019:1355). From this literature, there are 
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pointers that the challenge of poor service delivery in Uganda is by its nature organisational. Some 
service providers are not responsible in their quest to make available the necessary services such as 
road construction and maintenance. This condition is a big test for the significance of local 
Municipalities (many of which are already to attain city status), and as a consequence, demands 
immediate consideration. Considering this challenge, this article explores the means by which the 
accountability of service providers in the local Municipality can be enhanced. Consequently, this 
study's main objective is to suggest a model of municipal service providers in Uganda. In attaining 
this objective, the following research questions will be answered: (a) what are the techniques of 
enhancing accountability at a municipal council? (b) What are the dimensions of accountability in 
Municipalities in Uganda? (c) What value does accountability bring to pro-poor service delivery? 
And, (c) what are the implications of accountability for pro-poor service delivery in a municipal 
council?    
2. Literature review 
The necessity of accountability regarding pro-poor service delivery is enormous and has been 
approached differently by different authors though none has focused on Municipal councils in 
the Ugandan context. 
2.1. The concept of accountability 
There is a certain degree of confusion over the concept of accountability. It is a term used in a range 
of contexts with different meanings, and if not careful, the definition can lack clarity as an operational 
concept (Mir et al 2020:124). For example, some researchers recognise being accountable for being 
responsible, a perception that has been criticised for being too narrow (Ogentho et al 2020). 
Accountability is answerability or liability; these are both applicable in a range of contexts (Bryld et 
al 2020). According to Modoi (2015), the notion of accountability refers to an individual or 
establishment's obligation to answer for its actions, admit blame for them, and expose the outcomes in 
a crystal clear way. The above author adds that accountability embraces the obligation for funds or 
other assigned assets. It further refers to guaranteeing that administrators in governmental, private and 
non-governmental or voluntary sector organisations are liable for their activities and reparations when 
responsibilities and obligations are not discharged. The Republic of Uganda (Government of Uganda, 
1995) provides that whoever holds any public office, shall do so in trust for the citizens of Uganda. 
Consequently, every person entrusted in any position of leadership and or accountability shall be 
answerable to the people of Uganda in the exercise of their actions. The same Constitution further 
provides that every legal means shall be applied to uncover, combat, and eliminate dishonesty, 
misapplication, or mismanagement of authority by those entrusted with governmental or other public 
offices. This requirement is achieved through many established and individual government service 
ideals informing of policies, laws, rules, guidelines, codes of conduct and standing orders. In a similar 
tone, Article 17(I) (i) of the Uganda Constitution states that every citizen is accountable in fighting 
dishonesty and misappropriation and or wastage of government resources. 
In practice, accountability is demonstrated in various ways and at different levels. The different 
perspectives include presenting periodic performance reports, presenting financial reports, conducting 
internal and external audits, conducting staff performance appraisals, and conducting disciplinary 
measures.  
2.2. Presentation of periodic performance Reports  
Performance is defined as employees' contribution to make them attain goals (Herbert et al 2000). It is 
the measure of what an organization has accomplished with respect to the process, results, relevance 
and success Uganda National Development Program (1995). To others, performance denotes whether 
an official executes his/her duties and responsibilities well (Choge et al., 2014). Obtained evidence 
indicates municipal councils in Uganda do not present quarterly performance reports save for the 
annual reports since none of the supervisors appears to pursue the reports as a routine feedback. 
According to Su et al (2019:438), there is a close link between progressive feedback of a manager and 
the performance of employees although this is, in part, facilitated by employees pursuing the 
feedback. In the case of Ugandan Municipalities, it is injurious seeing that certain eventualities call 
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for immediate attention and if the council only considers the annual report then it becomes too late to 
address such issues. For example, staff in the department of environmental and sanitation in many 
Municipalities have issues that require immediate but had to wait for the year end to have them 
reported by the head of sector when it was too late. 
2.3. Presentation of financial reports  
Municipalities in Uganda apply both internal audit and external audit. The internal audit department 
conducts quarterly audits to identify issues that may call for instantaneous attention before the 
external audit is conducted, usually at the end of the year. The external audit is held once a year by the 
office of the auditor general. The two audits allow a municipal council to examine both quarterly 
financial reports and annual financial reports of a municipal council. The biggest shortcoming with 
these presentations is that the financial reports are presented in a financial language which can be 
understood by less than 20% of the council. This situation is not different from what was revealed in a 
study Kassem (2019:2008), who found that arrangements for financial reporting scam are committed 
and covered by those otherwise responsible in Egypt. As a result, the presentation of financial reports 
to the municipal council has become a ritual rather than making scrutiny and recommendations based 
on informed analysis.  
2.4. Conduct of internal and external audits  
Internal auditing is an independent appraisal function established within a municipal council to 
examine and evaluate its activities as a service to the citizens. The objective of internal auditing is to 
assist a municipal council in discharging of their responsibilities effectively. Internal auditing 
furnishes them with analyses, appraisals, recommendations, advice and information concerning the 
activities reviewed. According to Chiarini et al (2020) to enhance quality performance in an 
organisation, it is important to audit the key performance indicators and financial indicators and seek 
means to control ingenuities for improvement from within. Also, a study by Dardin et al (2020) on the 
perspectives between internal and external auditors reveals that external auditors are more serious, 
seeing that they do not work within the organisation which makes it very handy always to have them 
in Ugandan Municipalities. Consequently, the audit object includes promoting effective control at 
reasonable cost as well as how the municipal council learns if its internal control systems are 
appropriately designed and functioning. The key challenges with internal audit are; first, it is 
perceived to have little to offer and second, the internal auditors have a low status. Also, a study by 
White et al (2020:108) reveals that boundaries of accountability are unclear due to inadequate audit 
precautions to guarantee compliance and the participation of internal audit in handling assurance 
threat did not conform to expert guidance. These challenges call for the audit staff's reasonable 
assurance, a supportive attitude from both the political wing and the technical wing, integrity and 
competence. Otherwise, the external audit (Auditor general) attracts more respected by all municipal 
councils. 
2.5. Conducting staff performance appraisals  
Staff performance appraisal is one of the key instruments in managing staff performance in a 
municipal council. A municipal council appraises its employee performance regularly in order to 
define certain areas that require improvement where it is considered in terms of outcomes. A related 
study conducted among health workers in Hamadan, Iran, Majidi et al (2020) found a significant 
positive correlation between performance appraisal and job satisfaction. However, there were 
challenges in terms of futility of assessment statistics for improving performance, the dearth of instant 
and positive feedback and biased performance assessment. Obtainable evidence indicates that 
performance appraisal in a municipal council is transparent but not participatory. It does not involve 
the employee, peers, supervisor and clients except the supervisor and employee. Besides, feedback 
regarding staff appraisals is not given in time. Also, an appraisal outcome does not lead to any action 
such as training, transfer, recognition, special awards or disciplinary proceedings.  
2.6. Conducting disciplinary measures  
Municipal councils have been ridden by countless issues arising from political differences and lack of 
recognition of lower cadres by the top cadres who have built for themselves a sort of canopy. Within 
the technical wing, insights over classified benefits are reportedly common but rarely addressed by 
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department heads. For example, anecdotal evidence confirms evidence of late coming, absenteeism 
and sexual harassment, which have never been presented to any disciplinary meeting nor has any 
disciplinary measure ever been taken.   
3. Research methodology 
The central method for this article is a desk review of obtainable works on accountability in Uganda 
and other parts of Africa and the world. Desk research is described as the type of research where 
information is collected from obtainable sources, such as the internet, the press, books, journal 
articles, methodical and pragmatic reports, and statistical periodicals. According to the Management 
study guide (2013), desk review is often preceded by cross-referencing and information to make 
inferences and or conclusions. This method has been recognised to be very supportive and can be 
applied either in the initial stage of a study project or during the investigation as much of the essential 
information can be gathered before being used as a stock in the entire study process.  This Article is 
organised along five sections emerging from the questions, namely; section one covers literature 
review, section two covers the outcomes, and the last section brings forth the conclusion. 
4. Results and discussions 
4.1. Techniques of enhancing accountability in a Municipal council in Uganda 
There are some ways in which a Municipality can enhance accountability especially as a step towards 
effective preparation for an oil city that is slated to commence operation in 2021/22 financial year. 
These are; setting standards, answerability and sanction for errant conduct.  
Setting standards  
Standards can be set in the form of behaviour expected of every municipal officer heading a 
department (HoD) or sector. The criteria by which they might be judged are key. For example, 
evidence from a municipal council reveals that every HoD expected to draw a work plan detailing 
what activities shall be conducted in a particular period of not more than a month and showing the key 
outputs and resources to be used. These have been a very convenient means of ensuring accountability 
in a municipal council. A study by Sibanda et al (2020) in a South African Municipality reveals that 
when successfully executed, the twine measures of control and oversight decrease wastage eliminates 
moral malfeasance and encourages honesty, transparency, and accountability. Besides, every work 
plan is accompanied by an activity report at the end of every month indicating whether the planned 
activities were accomplished, the successes and failures registered and what can be done in the 
subsequent months to improve service delivery. According to Sibanda et al (2020), there is a need to 
seek means of reversing the weak application of in-house inventory controls and strategies, making it 
puzzling for in-house audit and oversight teams to identify unscrupulous, biased, discriminatory, 
hostile and cost-ineffective actions in time. 
Answerability 
a process in which the municipal officials are required to defend their actions, face sceptical questions 
and explain themselves during technical planning committee (TPC) meetings from time to time. 
According to Kwemarira et al (2019:2) answerability is closely associated with public interest and so 
this applies to both positive feedback and negative criticisms; these have kept a number of staff on 
their toes knowing that anytime the TPC sits they will be required to show cause. A municipal council 
also receives regular funding from government and partners to execute programs and projects outlined 
in the annual budgets. However, this funding is never adequate. In a number of instances, it has been 
declining; hence municipal councils in several countries have been forced to shift their responsibilities 
to the private sector as they, instead, adopt austerity measures (Stick & Ramos, 2019). As a result, 
answerability at the department, sector as well as periodic reporting to TPC are key. Finally, there are 
other mechanisms of answerability involving the general public or part of such as municipal barazas, 
periodic dialogue with the municipal development forum (MDF) and consultations between the 
technical wing and the municipal council's political wing.  
Use of sanction and/or reward  
When the account can be punished for falling below the standards expected of them and or rewarded 
for achieving or exceeding those standards. A number of Municipalities have been implementing a 
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defective sanction system, which has not facilitated the council to build a culture of respect for codes 
and standards because of the intertwined politics. Anecdotal evidence reveals that there are two camps 
in the council; when a punishment or reward is administered, it causes higher tempers in the whole 
council and has previously led to resignation of the chief accounting officer (the Town Clerk). A 
study by Huang et al (2020) shows rewards lead to psychological empowerment and organisational 
commitment. Consequently, the punishments seem more like random bad luck for the targets rather 
than the legitimate consequence of violating or not meeting the standards set. Municipalities have 
criminal justice sanctions (these follow the criminal justice pattern and trial before courts of law for 
misuse of principles for cases such as corruption are triable before courts) and the administrative 
sanctions (where various oversight mechanisms such as administrative tribunals and disciplinary 
committees are used at the municipal level), which it can administer to errant or excellent individuals. 
In short, accountability sequences in Municipalities are not as official and do not include all the 
aspects mentioned above. Nonetheless, accountability is about how those holding authority can be 
held openly responsible for their decisions or lack of. This reduces accountability a platform for 
testing, contesting and transforming a municipal council.   
4.2. Dimensions of accountability in Municipalities in Uganda   
While studies have shown that accountability has both demand and supply sides (Kessy, 2020), is 
categorised in three dimensions, namely; horizontal, vertical and diagonal. 
Horizontal accountability  
This form of accountability encompasses official relationships within a Municipality itself, whereby 
one municipal actor has the official power to demand details or enforce punishments on another 
(Almquist, 2012:2). Its emphasis is on in-house checks and balances within the municipal authority. 
For example, a municipal executive committee must explain its actions to the municipal council and 
sometimes take precedence or be sanctioned for abusing procedures. Besides, the Auditor General can 
call for accountability from a municipal council at the end of every financial year. While this demand 
can, as well, be classified as legal accountability, it is by its nature horizontal. Also, the Public 
accounts committee of Parliament can demand accountability as part of horizontal accountability 
between government institutions. According to Mubangizi (2019:557), Municipalities have an 
obligation to play a part in multifaceted arrangements of horizontal as well as vertical collaboration s 
in their quest for effective provision of services to the citizens. Such collaborations demonstrate 
phenomena of both the complex levels and the complex phases. However, a study conducted in Brazil 
by Fernandes et al (2020) reveals fragility in horizontal accountability at the subnational level which 
Ugandan Municipalities may have to contend with.  
Vertical accountability  
Vertical accountability involves a situation where citizens and their municipal council play direct 
roles in holding the powerful to account in the context of performance management system (Tran & 
Nguyen, 2020). Elections are the formal institutional channel of vertical accountability. But there are 
also informal processes through which citizens organise themselves into associations capable of 
lobbying Municipalities, demanding explanations and threatening less formal sanctions like negative 
publicity (Rohrer, 2020).  A Municipality can conduct barazas or interactive mass media on radios or 
close dialogue with MDFs as vertical accountability forms. This is in line with the requirement that all 
public offices and officers shall be answerable to Uganda's people.  
Diagonal accountability  
This form of accountability works in a sphere amid the vertical and horizontal dimensions. It denotes 
the process of direct citizen commitment with horizontal accountability organisations when provoking 
better oversight of municipal activities (Almquist, 2012:2). According to Modoi (2015), citizens can 
side-step burdensome or negotiated official accountability structures to engage in policy formulation, 
participate in budget process, and track the municipal outflow. For example, this platform is 
commonly used by civil society groups such as Transparency international, Citizen coalition Uganda, 
Anti-corruption coalition Uganda and the Civil society budget advocacy group which track the budget 
performance and accountability for public funds that have been allotted to diverse government 
institutions including Municipalities.  
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In delivering pro-poor services, Municipalities draw on intergovernmental relations (IGRs) with the 
central government. They gain from the oversight role of the central government as well as from the 
fiscal transfers they receive from the central government – in addition to the considerable oversight 
function of the Uganda association of urban councils (UAUCs). IGRs in Uganda's Municipalities have 
sometime been a modus operand in delivering services. Indeed, the Local Governments Act (LGA) 
(Government of Uganda, 1997) (as amended) states that Municipalities should seek for more 
innovative methods of not only providing and fast-tracking the delivery of services but remain 
accountable to the various constituents. In this respect, the LGA on municipal service delivery 
presents a structure in which to control and organize the funds of the public to meet the overall 
national development objectives. A number of authors have considered the worth and value of such a 
structure – see Ferreira (2018).   
Municipalities' principal structural arrangement collaborates with other municipal government levels 
through IGRs and intra-governmental relations – as outlined in the LGA (Government of Uganda, 
1997). Since the central government retains the obligation of supervisory oversight, this sets the 
structure for overall socio-economic progress and the delivery of basic services. The municipal 
council is expected to fit in this policy structure. Furthermore, the central government arranges much 
of the funds for service delivery, while the municipal government supervises the implementation of 
the scheduled programmes as outlined in the national policy agenda. To end, the municipal division 
sphere is the executing partner of those actions that lie inside the domain of the LGA. Normally, 
however, policy choices are entrusted to municipal divisions that lack adequate facilitation to deliver 
the services. Yet, this horizontal relationship is not the only one through which Municipalities operate. 
There is time and again a cluster of stakeholders, and Municipalities have developed relations with a 
number of service providers peripheral to them. In such cases, in service delivery, stakeholders like 
the civil society and the private sector emerge to reduce costs and develop ability for impending sub-
contracts – this enhances their accountability confidence. At the same time, the image of a municipal 
council improves.  
Maseko and Zaalman (2018:192) underlined a series of abilities vital to Municipalities to improve 
service delivery, for example, training staff with skills to implement regulations and authorisations, 
harmonising land tenure systems and improving negotiation abilities so as to enhance compromise as 
well as accountability. An example where a municipal council can provide accountability is 
environment and sanitation. A study by Mubangizi (2019) targeted improving service delivery 
through effective monitoring and evaluation in South African rural Municipalities. It was noted that 
through collaboration among the three stakeholders, namely Local Government, civil society and the 
private sector, working together would help moderate a condition in a certain community at the same 
time the idea of certain actors functioning alone would be reduced thus enhancing the quality-of-
service delivery as well as improving the degree of accountability. Forums such as the MDF in several 
other Municipalities in Uganda, can play the much-desired oversight role for the shortage of 
procedural and fiscal abilities and facilitate accountability in a municipal council.  
4.3. The value of accountability to a municipal council in Uganda   
Ugandan Municipalities are confronted with multifaceted and varied challenges as a result of high 
hopes from the numerous stakeholders to deliver on their obligation. To be more effective in service 
delivery, accountability is a very essential process that can aid programmes and projects to be 
executed so that the consequence of these courses will have a significant effect on the projected 
peoples (Mutabwire, 2013:7).  The concept of accountability has been and continue to be emphasised 
as well as practiced worldwide over the years (Almquist, 2012:2), with the purpose of attaining an 
effective and sustainable growth; it is key that programmes and projects are well accounted for. 
Worldwide, there has been amplified burden on administrations and a number of stakeholders to be 
more accountable relative to how their citizens' aspirations and desires are met through the principles 
of good governance and be more answerable and transparent so as to uphold efficacy. In consequence, 
there is a shift to better-quality performance, which has obliged the necessity to account for 
programmes and projects. As a result, performance is becoming one of the key tools to management 
used to improve the public sector's actions to support in the achievement of a feasible consequence of 
development ingenuities in the communities (Modoi, 2015:4).      
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Uganda's government has acknowledged the significance of accountability as a necessary programme 
that could be included in every programme and project write up as an instrument for attaining socio-
economic transformation. This resulted into the formation of the Public accounts committee (PAC) in 
Parliament as well as every local or urban government, and the directorate of ethics and integrity in 
the office of the president, charged with the obligation of guaranteeing that the numerous programmes 
and policies follow to the doctrine of accountability (Modoi, 2015:12). The United Nations 
development programme (UNDP) describes accountability as the way in which accountability is 
conducted in Uganda is, to some extent, multifaceted, as a result of the devolution of authority and, 
per se, not much can be achieved in the Municipalities minus substantial support from the central 
government. Ogentho, Munene, Kamukama and Mpeera (2020) studied the influence of social capital 
on the behaviour of citizens and accountability among Local Governments in SSA noting that a 
deficiency of effective accountability is until now a key challenge which several stakeholders are 
faced with; one possible alternative is to mobilise the citizens to demand accountability since the 
consequence is the failure of the numerous programmes and projects to reach the set standards. 
Consequently, no constructive impact is felt by the numerous publics upon implementation. This is 
reinforced by how accountability is conducted in Municipalities. Due to the intricacy of accountability 
in Uganda, it is established that it has not been meaningfully attributable to the absence of political 
will among the Municipalities' elected representatives, besides a dearth of essential abilities to carry 
out an effective audit. 
Galanti and Turri (2020) note that reliance on the fiscal assets and the partisan salience tends to 
relegate the municipal councilors' will and the technical staff to seek appropriate options to challenges 
affecting development. Therefore, one can maintain that imagining struggling Municipalities to obey 
every requirement of accountability sensibly is as bad as adding hitherto additional accountabilities. 
Nonetheless, given any mention to accountability, the policy structure is aware of this view. The 
structure states that seeing that it is a requirement to lessen the harmonisation of managerial 
accountability across government and that execution achievements should be linked to present 
abilities aimed to build capacity over the medium-term. This is relevant to Municipalities particularly 
those that are constrained by a number of challenges. While local potential need not command an 
enduring model for accountability, the potential of local Municipalities should be included in the 
operation plans and effective management of any threat. 
According to Guevara (2015), Municipalities in much of Africa invented modern methods such as 
public-private partnerships (PPPs) so as to embrace the private sector in providing municipal services. 
These stakeholders have connections with one another, which enhances the degree of involvedness 
favoring dishonesty. Such relationships can be managed and it is this view that has witnessed growing 
interface between the service providers and service beneficiaries. A web of stakeholders instead of a 
direct procedure will require more complex accountability modalities that will restrain opportunities 
for corruption. A number of actions are key in municipal councils and these can favour the delivery of 
pro-poor services in a number of sub-constituencies in many ways. 
The IGRs structure provides a structure for the different spheres of government and every organ of the 
state to allow coordination in the execution of policies, including accountability to make sure that 
there is a clear government structure for attaining its objectives. For example, the IGRs within a 
municipal council serve as an opening for Municipality to participate more effectively in providing an 
oversight role. The LGA provides that municipal IGR should make sure that there is effective 
direction and configuration of both the long-term and short-term plans and objectives of a municipal 
council and any issues that can benefit the communities they serve. However, studies (such as Favero, 
Gatto, Deutsch & Pattenella, 2016) reveal that municipal IGRs have not that effective due, in part, to 
shortage of capacity at the municipal level. One of the most outstanding laws on accountability for 
Municipalities, is the Local Governments Act (Government of Uganda, 1997), which underscores the 
details of accountability and the essential aspects that should be taken into account. Furthermore, the 
Act proposes that Municipalities establish a process of consistent reporting on accountability so as to 
the council, the technical planning committee, standing committees, the MDF and the public through 
local radio talk shows.  
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4.4. Implications of accountability for pro-poor service delivery in a municipal council    
The central description evolving from the accounts of this article, is that. In contrast, ill resourced 
rural Municipalities are likely to benefit from robust methods of accountability, there are, at present, 
insufficient procedures being trailed by Ugandan Municipalities and this might be resulting from 
scarcity of essential skills. As the debate has revealed, this is attributable to the scale of regulation that 
either disregards or overshadows the municipal council's will and its technical managers to seek 
inventive local options to local challenges. The debate has revealed that cooperation between a 
municipal council and various stakeholders in a self-organising way, seems to be budding as a muddle 
through instrument in a municipal council. The opinion, here, is to be acquainted with intricacy and 
absence of linearity in the delivery of services and consequently seek out means to incorporate aspects 
at more than one level and sequential gauge. From the debate, the ensuing propositions are advanced: 
First, the ultimate structure should yield info appropriate to a rural Municipality while being 
consistent and appropriate enough to advise and effect procedures for preparation and 
implementation. Second, a model structure of accountability grounded on the viable livelihood 
arrangement necessitates complete information that cross-examines all five aspects of the agenda and 
procedure and other official procedures of municipal governance (Mulgan, 2017). Third, a municipal 
council should continue to be an essential participant so that there is navigation from the external with 
track from the internal seeing that the multifaceted structure is at probabilities with the design of 
explicit objectives and plans to inform the situation of pro-poor service delivery. Finally, a supreme 
structure of accountability should have operative instruments for presenting accountability to a 
diversity of stakeholders, who, characteristically, consist of the elected (politicians), the appointed 
(technical staff) and the residents (beneficiaries).  
5. Conclusion  
This article examined how accountability is executed in a Ugandan Municipality for resolves of 
efficiently delivering pro-poor services. It is observed that the concern of accountability in Uganda 
remains attracting substantial consideration, as a result of its significance in supporting Municipalities 
and other entities of government to accomplish their mandate of enhancing wealth creation. A 
municipal council needs the participation of a variety of stakeholders working in a multifaceted 
system to attain its mandate is an additional goal why the processes of accountability require to be 
prioritised above board. Above all, the structures of accountability should be easy to get to for diverse 
users; they should be hands-on as well as endearing for both the beneficiaries and the service 
providers. The present process of accountability in Municipalities is primarily executed through 
constitutional structures whose operative rules are outlined in a variety of municipal government laws 
and guidelines. Although these are essential and helpful, this article's debate has revealed that non-
constitutional arrangements shaped out of improvised self-organising approaches can deliver 
advantageous pro-poor service delivery opportunities. It is exposed, without thorough accountability 
procedures, through an all-embracing strategy, with participation from numerous participants at the 
diverse levels of government as well as local communities, together with development of skills and 
political will, endeavours of accountability will continue to be one of the disappointments, with the 
prospective to further relegate municipal councils in the country. To sum up, hands-on accountability 
holds potential in this regard, and requires more consideration as a means to assimilate learning-based 
methods as well as role-players network to back up the delivery of pro-poor services. 
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